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THE THREE L'S -LAW, LABOR, LIBERTY
Maurice H. Merrill*
1. Preliminary Survey
In supporting congressional authorization for union shop agreements be-
tween railroads and the bargaining agents of their employees, Mr. Justice
Douglas of the Supreme Court of the United States said that this presented
"no more of an infringement or impairment of first amendment rights than
there would be in the case of a lawyer who by state law is required to be a mem-
ber of an integrated bar."' Five years and many words later, he declared "the
analogy fails."2 The discovery of failure had no effect upon the views of the
learned Justice respecting legislative competence to sanction union shops. He
adhered to the views expressed in his opinion for the Court upholding that
power.3 Instead his view apparently was that, in distinction to compulsory
unionism's promotion of "the well-established institution of collective bargaining
as one of the means of preserving industrial peace," 4 the integrated bar is a
"guild" which marshals its members "into goose-stepping brigades."'
This further reflection was forced upon Mr. Justice Douglas by litigants
who took up the issue, reserved in the prior decision, of compulsory membership
as "a cover for forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention
of the First Amendment."' These protagonists emphasized their objections to
the expenditure of their dues for the advancement of unspecified but, allegedly,
to them, obnoxious, opinions and proposals for governmental action on ques-
* A.B. and LL.B., University of Oklahoma, 1919 and 1922 respectively; S.J.D., Harvard
University, 1925; member of the Oklahoma bar; Research Professor of Law at the University
of Oklahoma.
1 See Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
2 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 879 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
3 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 775 (1961) (concurring
opinion).
4 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 880 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
5 Id. at 878.
6 Id. at 884.
7 Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
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tions of public importance.8 Thereby, they split into many splinters what the
Hanson decision had indicated was a sturdy, scatheless and unific bench.' As
a result, only by Mr. Justice Douglas' deference to "the practical problem of
mustering five Justices for a judgment,"'" and by putting the decision upon
statutory rather than upon constitutional grounds, was it possible to produce
an opinion of the Court in respect to the use of union dues. As to the integrated
bar, the views were so disparate that no majority opinion could be constructed.
Mr. Justice Black acerbically commented upon the difficulty of determining
the effect of the decision.1 In each case, the basic constitutional problems were
left undecided, despite the devotion to the discussion of over 144 pages of the
United States Reports, including opinions written by a total of six judges. In
this posture of the decisional law, discussion of the constitutional issues seems
justified.
Preliminarily, we should survey the constitutional provisions over the
meaning of which the contests rage. Questions concerning the authority of
Congress to legislate concerning the conditions of labor upon the nation's rail-
roads obviously do not arise. That issue was settled long ago.' No subsequently
intervening circumstances suggest the possibility of successful challenge to this
application of the federal commerce power as supported by the necessary and
proper clause.' The question, rather, is whether some substantive constitutional
restriction upon the power of the national legislature has been violated. As to
the states, of course, the problem for the national judiciary revolves solely about
federal constitutional limitations.
As to nation and state alike, the current controversies center on the applica-
tion of the guaranties respecting freedom, in one form or another.' 4 With
reference to the federal power, there is the first amendment's prohibition that
Congress "make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ...."
More significant still, because of wider possibility of application, are the broad
prescriptions of the fifth amendment, "nor shall any person.., be deprived of
.. liberty ... without due process of law... ," and the parallel prohibition
against the states contained in the fourteenth amendment. This wider ap-
plicability of the fifth and fourteenth amendments arises from the fact that it
is liberty of all kinds, not merely of speech or of the press, that they protect,
coupled with the doctrinal development whereby due process of law means
not merely compliance with established and decorous forms of procedure but,
8 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
9 It seems unlikely that the intervening succession of Justices Minton, Reed and Burton
by Justices Brennan, Whittaker and Stewart is an appreciable factor in the splintering process.
The continuing members of the court differ as widely in their positions as do the new
threesome.
10 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 778-79 (1961) (concurring
opinion).
11 "I do not believe that either the bench, the bar or the litigants will know what has
been decided in this case - certainly I do not." Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 865
(1961) (dissenting opinion).
12 Texas & N.O.R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930);
Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917).
13 See Railway Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
14 No doubt, in certain circumstances, a question concerning the equal protection of
the laws, under the fourteenth amendment, might arise as against the states. To date, this
has not been involved in the contest concerning the validity of state integrated bars.
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as well, protection of "the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty,
and property" as against "arbitrary legislation."'I
It is true, of course, that there is a tendency, unfortunately supported by
some judicial usage, to speak loosely of certain portions of the first eight amend-
ments, and particularly, of the first amendment, as having been incorporated
as limitations on the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.16 This seems to me an intellectual standing broad jump of no mean pro-
portions. The least degree of respect for written law as an exercise in the com-
munication of ideas requires that the due process of law clauses of the fifth
and the fourteenth amendments be treated as imposing similar restraints upon
the governmental units to which, respectively, they are addressed.' And a
like respect requires that the first amendment's protections should not be re-
garded as completely comprehended within the due process clause of the fifth
amendment." The truth is that the opinion in the case which initially accepted
the view that fourteenth amendment liberty included free speech did not say
at all that it incorporated the first amendment.' The language to that effect
later employed by the Court may be merely careless. It also may be an attempt
to carry over into the application of the fourteenth amendment the same sharp-
ness of limitation that some find in the negative imperatives of the first amend-
ment. Mr. Justice Holmes, although he thought that the fourteenth amend-
ment limitation should have brought reversal in the Gitlow case, made no such
identification of the two amendments. 0 It may be that in application the scope
of the two provisions does not differ widely, since the "clear and present danger
test" under the first amendment has been watered down by the late decisions.2"
Still, there remains the possibility that an abridgment of freedom of speech in
violation of the first amendment might not be so arbitrary as to contravene the
requirements of due process of law.22 We should hold this in mind, as we con-
sider the various "liberties" which may be affected, in one way or another, by
compulsory unionism or by integration of the bar.
15 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532 (1884).
16 "And it falls squarely under the ban of the First Amendment (made applicable to the
States by the Fourteenth) . . ." Illinois ex. rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S.
203, 210 (1948) (Black, J.). Still more regrettable is the next step, to make the simple
inquiry, "whether New York . . . has either prohibited the 'free exercise' of religion or has
made a law 'respecting an establishment of religion' within the meaning of the First Amend-
ment," without any reference whatever to the fourteenth. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
310 (1952) (Douglas, J.).
17 See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203,
228 (1942); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927); Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310,
325 (1903).
18 Cf. Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HAnv. L. REV.
431, 441, 463 (1926).
19 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The Court stated that freedom of
speech and of the press "are among the . . . 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. .... "
20 Id. at 672 (dissenting opinion).
21 Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367
U.S. 1 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
22 See the excellent discussion of this point in Nutting, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?,
30 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 167, 176 (1961).
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2. Liberty of Solitude
When a Daniel Boone or a Montford Johnson found that the neighbors
were crowding him too closely, his problem could be solved by moving on into
still unoccupied territory.23 Even in Massachusetts in the nineteenth century,
Thoreau could retire to the shores of Walden Pond, but he could not escape the
taxgatherer. Today, the seceder from society must go to harsh climates and
inhospitable lands to escape from his fellows. Even there, he is apt to find the
law impinging upon his enjoyment of the wilderness. 2 In any.event, the society
he has scorned is likely to envelop him with radioactive currents against which
remoteness is no defense. The day for solitude as a way of life is past, and the
Constitution cannot help it.
Physical solitude, however, is not the real objective of most people in our
present age. The "lone wolves" want to remain in society. They want jobs.
They want access to the various amenities of our communities. Their plaint
is that they want all this on their own terms. Obviously, the request is impos-
sible to grant. Our constitutional guaranties never have been so read.2" Under
them, "the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires
the protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals
and welfare of the people."2 Liberty, then, generally is subject to being defined
and limited by the balancing of social and of individual interests.27 While "the
right to hold specific private employment and to follow a chosen profession free
from unreasonable governmental interference comes within the 'liberty' and
'property' concepts of the Fifth Amendment ... "28 and of the fourteenth too,
"there is no arbitrary deprivation of such right where its exercise is not per-
mitted because of a failure to comply with conditions imposed by the state for
the protection of society."2 In accordance with these general principles, sub-
scribed to by judges of diversified times and temperaments, the Supreme Court
repeatedly has upheld requirements that practitioners of particular occupations
enroll, establish their skill in various ways, and pay fees to support the official
23 See JOHNSON, TE CHICKASAW RANCHER, 109 (1961).
24 Perko v. United States, 204 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 832
(1953); United States v. Perko, 133 F. Supp. 564 (D. Minn. 1955); Bydlon v. U. S., 175
F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
25 We are not prepared to admit that a minority... enjoying the general
protection afforded by an organized local government, may ... defy the will
of its constituted authorities, acting in good faith for all, under the legisla-
tive sanction of the State. If such be the privilege of a minority then a like
privilege would belong to each individual of the community, and the
spectacle would be presented of the welfare and safety of an entire popu-
lation being subordinated to the notions of a single individual who chooses
to remain a part of that population. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 37-38 (1905) (Harlan, J.).
26 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (Hughes, C. J.).
27 "Liberty implies only freedom from arbitrary restraint, not immunity from reasonable
regulations and prohibitions imposed in the interests of the community." Hardware Dealers'
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 157 (1931) (Stone, J.). The same dis-
tinguished jurist reminded us that where "the means chosen are appropriate to the permissible
end, there is little scope for the operation of the due process clause." Virginian Ry. Co. v.
System Federation No. 40, Ry. Employees' Dep't, 300 U.S. 515, 558, (1937).
28 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959).
29 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889).
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regulation of their vocations."0 Liberty of solitude in one's calling is not part
of our constitutional birthright. This much even Mr. Justice Douglas conceded. 1
It is compulsory membership in an organization to which he objects.
3. Liberty to Stand Alone
"Dare to be a Daniel! Dare to stand alone!" This part of the refrain from
a gospel hymn of the last century comes back from the memories of my child-
hood with a compelling sense of its fitness to invoke the value which lies back
of the doubt that troubles Mr. Justice Douglas in respect to the integrated bar,
and that troubles others about compulsory unionism. We took our start, in large
measure, from dissent and from the migration of those who found it impossible
to dissent at home. Therefore, high on the list of the varieties of freedom
grouped under our great constitutional concept of Liberty should be the liberty
to stand alone, "freedom not to associate," as one court has put it. 2
We have seen, however, that all these freedoms are relative. It becomes ap-
propriate, therefore, to subject the restriction upon freedom to stand alone in-
volved in compulsory membership in labor unions and in bar associations to
analysis, in order to determine the objectives of the legislation and the compara-
tive weight of these social purposes in relation to the restriction imposed by the
legislation.
The objective of the legislation permitting union shop agreements"3 is to
promote the collective bargaining process in industry, viewed by Congress as a
means of harmonizing and stabilizing the operation of industry as an instrument
of national commerce. The constitutional propriety of this objective long has
been recognized. The particular means by which it is here to be promoted
is the requirement that all employees may be bound by contract, between the
employer and the union which has achieved collective bargaining status, to
become members of that union, thus doing away with the threat to effective
bargaining posed by the existence of a large minority of "free riders" who get
the benefit of the bargaining without sharing any of its cost. 5 The burden of
this contribution is limited by the restriction to "periodic dues, initiation fees
and assessments (not including fines and penalties)" which must be fixed on
"the same terms and conditions as are generally applicable to any other mem-
ber,"3 " The reasonable relationship of means to objective stands adjudicated,"
30 Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425 (1926); Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923)
(dentistry); Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910) (medicine); Dent v. West Virginia,
supra note 29 (medicine). Cf. Lehman v. State Board of Public Accountancy, 263 U.S. 394
(1923) (accountancy).
31 See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 878 (dissenting opinion).
32 Pappas v. Stacey, 151 Me. 36, 116 A.2d 497, 500 (1955).
33 See 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1958).
34 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Virginian Ry. Co. v.
System Federation No. 40, Ry. Employees' Dep't, 300 U.S. 515 (1937); Texas & N.O.R.R.
Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
35 See McConkey, Was the Agency Shop Prematurely Scrapped?, 9 LAB. L. J. 150 (1958),
for a short statement of this position.
36 64 Stat. 1238 (1951), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1958).
37 "To require, rather than to induce, the beneficiaries of trade unionism to contribute
to its costs may not be the wisest course. But Congress might well believe that it would help
insure the right to work in and along the arteries of interstate commerce." Douglas, J., speak-
ing for the court in Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson 351 U.S. 225, 235 (1956).
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and indeed it is difficult to see how, rationally, it could be denied. The consti-
tutional defects, if any, must be found at the third step of due process analysis
- the possibility of interference with too many legitimate interests of those
affected by the requirement.
When we turn to the integrated bar, the social objectives become more
complex. Many have been enumerated: facilitation of the needed discipline
of unworthy members;3" betterment of the profession through improvement of
its economic status; increased capacity for public service through various educa-
tional activities; facilitation of control over unauthorized practice by persons
not subject to professional responsibility; the bettering of public relations, in-
cluding the enlightenment of laymen as to matters of concern to them; discussion
and promotion of reform in legal procedure, the administration of justice and
in the substantive law."9
All these certainly seem to fall within the scope of legitimate social objec-
tives. Mr. Justice Douglas apparently has some reservations. He referred to the
Wisconsin brand of integration as having "the mark of 'a lawyer class or caste'
- the system of 'a self-governing and self-disciplining bar' such as England has."'"
He seems also to think that there is danger of the policing of the lawyers by
their own competitors. Thus he said, in a footnote, that a "self-policing provision
whereby lawyers were given the power to investigate and disbar their associates
would raise under most, if not all, state constitutions the type of problem pre-
sented in Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495."41 The meaning of
this reference is obscure. The case cited turned upon the lack of any meaningful
standards to guide the exercise of the power delegated, a power vested not in
competitors but in no lower an officer than the President of the United States.
A more appropriate citation would have been to the Carter case, with its principle
that "in the very nature of things, one person may not be entrusted with the
power to regulate the business of another and especially of a competitor."'42
But, to repeat other words of Mr. Justice Douglas, already quoted, "the analogy
fails." In the first place, the activities of integrated bars in respect to discipline
are exercised by persons having official standing under rules of court, not by
lawyers in their individual capacity.43 In the second place the ultimate authority
to impose discipline normally is exercised by the courts themselves. The lawyers
do not disbar their fellows. In a few instances, preliminary authority to enter
disciplinary orders has been vested in tribunals formed from members of the
bar, but this has been safeguarded by the revisory power of the judiciary. State
38 The advantage of cooperation of bench and bar in professional discipline was stressed
in In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, 133 Neb. 283, 275 N.W. 265 (1937).
39 Most of these were adverted to in the Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in Lathrop
v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404 (1960).
40 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 882 (1961) (dissenting opinion). In the next
breath Justice Douglas declared, "The pattern of this legislation is regimentation."
41 Lathrop v. Donohue, supra note 40, at 878 n. 1.
42 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
43 As to Wisconsin, see Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404, 414
(1960). As to Oklahoma, see Art. VII, Revised Rules Creating, Controlling and Regulating
the Oklahoma Bar Association, 33 OKLA. BAR ASS'N J. 135, 140 (1962). This point is
emphasized in the concurring opinion of Harlan, J., in Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820,
854 (1961).
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decision has considered this sufficient to safeguard against abuse." In other
areas of human behavior, the Supreme Court of the United States has placed
like confidence in the effectiveness of judicial review.45
It may well be that Mr. Justice Douglas entertains doubt concerning the
legitimacy of the alleged public interest in some activities of integrated bars.
He recited:
It is true that one of the purposes of the State Bar Association
is "to safeguard the proper professional interests of the members
of the bar." State Bar of Wisconsin, Rule 1, § 2. In this connection,
the association has been active in exploiting the monopoly position
given by the licensed character of the profession. Thus, the Bar
has compiled and published a schedule of recommended minimum
fees. See Wis. Bar Bull., Aug. 1960, p. 40. Along the same line,
the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, along with
a Committee on Inter-professional and Business Relations, has
been set up to police activities by nonprofessionals within "the
proper scope of the practice of law." State Bar of Wisconsin, By-
Laws, Art. IV, §§ 8, 11.46
Later he remarked that "the present association" cannot "be defended on
grounds that it renders only public services,"4 stating that this objection might
not be relevant were the law in issue one, for example, which required. lawyers
to contribute to a fund to protect clients whose attorneys turned out to be em-
bezzlers. There is implicit the suggestion, therefore, that a state may not con-
stitutionally interest itself in advancing the material prosperity of a group as a
means to enable that group better to perform its obligations of public service.
Intellectually, something might be said for this. But to sustain it as a legal
proposition would require the abandonment of a long-established American tra-
dition, going back to the very foundation of the governmeit." It would com-
mand the overruling, as we have seen, of well-established precedents. Of course,
this by itself is not an invincible answer to any proposition of constitutional
law. But it does suggest that acceptance of the proposition to which it applies
should rest on careful exploration. There is no indication that the Supreme
Court is about to embark upon such an exploration. Even the other dissenter
in Lathrop, Mr. Justice Black, was prepared to assent that the integrated bar
"does . . . provide many useful and entirely lawful services."" Mr. Justice
Brennan, speaking for himself and three other Justices, after surveying these
activities in detail, including those upon which Mr. Justice Douglas animad-
verted, said that "the bulk of State Bar activities serve the function, or at least
so Wisconsin might reasonably believe, of elevating the educational and ethical
standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service
available to the people of the State. . . ."" "It cannot be denied," he con-
cluded, "that this is a legitimate end of state policy."'" Mr. Justice Harlan, who
44 E.g., State Bar of Oklahoma v. McGhee, 148 Okla. 219, 298 Pac. 580 (1927).
45 E.g., New York v. Van de Can-, 199 U.S. 552 (1905).
46 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 880 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
47 Id. at 881.
48 HAmILTON, REPORT ON THE SUBJECT OF MANUFACTURES (1790).
49 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 874 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
50 Id. at 843 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
51 Ibid.
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spoke also for Mr. Justice Frankfurter, fully concurred. 2 As things now stand,
we may take it that a clear majority of the Court approves the objectives of the
integrated bar as constitutionally permissible goals for state policy.
Little need be said as to the relation between end and means. Voluntarism
has failed in this area, as the Wisconsin court acknowledged in proclaiming its
decision in favor of integration." Obviously, theii, the resort must be to some
form of compelled cooperation, or, at least, to some form of compelled con-
tribution of financial support. This could be accomplished by means of a tax
levy, earmarked for that purpose. The integrated bar, with annual dues, really
is no different. 4 The relationship of end to means becomes self-evident. More-
over, the Court has recognized the propriety of placing upon those whose ac-
tivities give rise to special problems the burden of supporting the cost of deal-
ing with these problems.5" We come, then, to the question whether the impact
upon individual interest is too great.
So far as the claimed interest in being a lone wolf is concerned, there is,
after all, little impingement upon it by either the labor or the bar regulations.
The compelled association amounts to no more than association in the payment
of money and in an inscription upon membership rolls. The union member-
by-compulsion need not attend meetings, hold office, or participate in "his"
union's functions. Indeed, it has been held up as a shortcoming of modem day
unionism that most of those who come to their membership voluntarily do none
of these things."5 Balanced against the trusteeship which the law imposes upon
the organization, whether by interpretation of the statute 7 or upon analogy
to the common law public utility status of virtual monopolies,5" whatever
sacrifice of individuality is involved seems infinitesimal indeed. When this small
diminution of personal status is weighed in the constitutional scale against the
public purposes, achievement of which is sought by the strengthening of col-
lective negotiation, it is small wonder that it causes not the slightest jiggle in
the pans of the constitutional balance.
The introvert lawyer resisting integration has no better case. As the Su-
preme Court of Wisconsin pointed out when the Lathrop case was before it:
The rules and by-laws of the State Bar, as approved by this
court, do not compel the plaintiff to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend its meetings or vote in its elections
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he has been sub-
jected by the integration of the bar is the payment of the annual
dues of $15 per year59
52 367 U.S. at 861 (concurring opinion).
53 In re Integration of the Bar, 273 Wis. 281, 77 N.W.2d 602, 603 (1956).
54 This point is made in Lathrop by Harlan, at 860, and by Whittaker, at 865. In effect,
it is conceded by Black, at 877, his point being that the "tax" must not be devoted to advocacy
in the social arena.
55 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911); New York v. Squire, 145 U.S. 175
(1892); Charlotte, C. & A.R.R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386 (1892).
56 See LENS, THE CRISIS OF AMERICAN LABOR 49 (1959).
57 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Steele v. Louis-
ville & N.R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
58 James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1945); Bautista v. Jones,
25 Cal. 2d 746, 155 P.2d 343 (1945).
59 Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404, 408 (1960).
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It is most unlikely that the Supreme Court will give to such an "airy nothing
a local habitation and a name." We may take it that "compulsory unionism"
and "compulsory bar association membership" in the attenuated form in which
thus far they have been presented properly are free from the taints which lead
to declarations of unconstitutionality.
Of course this does not mean that all aspects which institutions of this sort
may take will be acceptable to the judges. I should suppose that too heavy
burdens of participation in group affairs may not be laid upon those who are
made members against their will in any organization. The days have long
passed when one could be required to accept public office.60 The armed forces
remain as the outstanding form of continuing association on behalf of the
public weal in which one may be compelled to take membership.6" There are
others, as the sustention of the compulsory welding of entrepreneural activity
known as the compulsory unitization of oil fields illustrates. 2 But instances of
this sort are supported by public interests of extremely high order. It seems
unlikely that compelled service in aid of union activities or of bar association
work will be connected, in an immediately foreseeable future, with interests
of such outstanding magnitude. Consequently, it may be assumed that the burden
of substantial affirmative participation in the work of either unions or of bar
organizations may not validly be laid upon reluctant shoulders. Under present
conditions, the question probably is academic in any event.
4. Liberty of Thought
"Dare to have a purpose true!" Thus continues the refrain. Mr. Justice
Black, in his dissent in the Lathrop case, asserted "the interest of the individual
lawyers of Wisconsin in having full freedom to think their own thoughts ... .
Implicit in this phrasing is the notion that in some way bar integration restricts
the intellectual operations of the individual lawyers. The point was not raised
by Mr. Justice Douglas, unless, perhaps, it is contained in his statements that
by the decision "we practically give carte blanche to any legislature to put at
least professional people into goose-stepping brigades," 4 and that "the First
Amendment applies strictures designed to keep our society from becoming
moulded into patterns of conformity which satisfy the majority."65 It was not
raised in his labor union opinions. Whether this is on the assumption that
blue collars are surmounted by tougher minds than are white collars or is based
upon some other consideration, we can but surmise.
One is tempted to return to this implication the short and impolite ver-
nacular injunction: "Don't be silly!" One recalls Galileo's alleged murmur,
60 State v. McEntyre, 25 N.C. 171 (1842).
61 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). Of course, there is also the posse
comitatus.
62 Palmer Oil Corp. v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 343 U.S. 390 (1952); see Merrill,
The Legal Status of a Statutory Oil and Gas Production Unit, 10 OKLA. L. REv. 249 (1957),
for details of the degree of association involved.
63 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 874 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
64 Id. at 884 (Douglas, J., dissenting). -
65 Id. at 885.
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"Eppur si muove," after finishing his recantation, and the ancient judge's as-
sertion that "the Devil himself knoweth not the heart of man." This is to say
that no constitution is needed to guarantee freedom of thought. Certainly no
judicial intervention is needed. We may put bounds upon expression of thought
but we cannot bind thought itself.
There may be another side to this, however. Willard Hurst has com-
mented upon the fact that the "size and internal discipline of great organizing
institutions tend[s] in practice to make any but institutional norms irrelevant
in large areas of life as criteria of action." 6 So great is the outcry in our current
literature against the cult of conformity that one almost marks himself as a radical
nonconformist if he contradicts it. We must admit, therefore, that what our
associates proclaim as their thought tends to influence our own mental processes.
May it not be said, then, that to throw one, against his will, into association
with others is to impose bounds upon his liberty of thought?
To this consideration, the answer must be one of practicality rather than
of theory. This group threat to free thought inheres in man's nature as a social
animal. We cannot think of man outside of society. So long as he lives in so-
ciety, he is subject to the impact of the ideas expressed by the majority of the
group with which he is associated and to the tendency to conform to these ex-
pressions. He will yield or resist according to his own intellectual toughness
and to his personal strength of character. Unless we disorganize society, we can-
not relieve him from the strain of exposure to the thoughts of others. The most,
then, that can be made out of this appeal to embrace freedom of thought with-
in our constitutional liberties is that we shall not subject the individual unduly
to the influence upon his thought processes which is exerted by the assertions
of others.
In determining whether forced groupings of the sort under discussion in-
volve this undue subjection, we must keep in mind the limited degree of asso-
ciation actually involved. If the forced member need not attend meetings, he
certainly can be free from hearing the views there expressed. Equally is he left
free to decline to read the literature which the group sends to its members.
Therefore, he has in his own hands the keys to escape from such compulsion
on his thought as might arise from hearing or reading the expressions of others.
When we weigh the issues thus, they seem to indicate a result similar to that
which we reached in considering the claim of a liberty to stand alone. The imz
pact upon the individual is of little greater force than that which he encounters
simply by being a member of society. The social advantages surely outweigh
the very slight additional trammel set upon freedom of the mind. The attack
from this direction upon compelled membership fails.
5. Liberty of Expression
"Dare to make it known!" Thus ends the refrain. Here we have liberty
of speech and the press, or, more broadly and accurately, liberty of expres-
sion. This, indeed, is a fundamental, guaranteed against Congress, as it is, by
66 HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 163 (1960).
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the first amendment, on the petition of many of the states in their acts of rati-
fication. It is of no less importance as guaranteed against the states as one of
the liberties protected by the first section of the fourteenth amendment.
But analysis becomes important, particularly when we reflect that neither
the union shop legislation nor the bar integration measures call upon those who
are drafted into membership to give any affirmation of belief. The complaints
that have been voiced are founded upon the fact that the groups in which
membership is compelled do take public positions upon various issues. In some
way, this is considered to be a violation of the individual's freedom of expression.
The simplest position is one given voice by Mr. Justice Douglas: "Join-
ing is one method of expression." 7 Obviously, we cannot dissent from this state-
ment, where joining is free and uncompelled. Joining the N.A.A.C.P. surely
may be regarded as a method of affirmation in certain sections of the country.6"
In other parts of the polity, similar effect will attach to public adherence to
the John Birch Society. It is quite different, however, when the association is
not free and voluntary. No one would assume that every draftee thereby in-
dicates approval of the foreign policy of the United States or of the employ-
ment of his unit in its aid. No more does forced membership in union or in
bar groups indicate adherence of the member to the publicized views of the
group. This is true even in the case of voluntary membership organizations. A
few years ago when the ghost-dancing on behalf of the Bricker Amendment 9
had stampeded the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association into
indorsement of that proposal, there were many members who opposed it. It
may well be that in fact they constituted a majority of the whole. A great many
were vocal in opposition. Others were silent. But comparatively few were im-
pelled to resign from the Association because of their dissent from the organi-
zation's official stand. They recognized that the Association did not speak for
them, and that intelligent outsiders would not confound the organizational ex-
pression with their own. Surely Mr. Justice Harlan is correct when he says that
"we should pause before assuming that particular Bar members can sensibly
hear their own voices when the State Bar speaks as an organization."" The
concept of compelled affirmation of belief simply will not wash.
Another attempted approach to the concept of liberty of expression is the
argument that compelled membership discourages or renders less effective the
voicing of dissent to the organization's proposals. The latter proposition is in
some ways simply a remolding of the argument concerning compelled affirma-
67 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 882 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
68 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958).
69 The aptness of the comparison between the ghost dancers and the Brickerites is em-
phasized by the comment that the ghost dance was practiced by the Indians "in the vain
belief that it would restore them and their deceased ancestors to a fast-disappearing way of
life." MILLER, GHoST DANCE vii (1959). On the ghost dance in a different area, see MARRIOTT,
THE TEN GRANDMOTHERS, 196-205 (1945).
70 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 859 (1961) (concurring opinion). Immediately
preceding this, Mr. Justice Harlan well said: "Surely the Wisconsin Supreme Court is ight
when it says that petitioner can be expected to realize that 'everyone understands or should
understand' that the views expressed are those 'of the State Bar as an entity separate and
distinct from each individual.'" Ibid.
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tion. Once we are agreed that forced membership does not express assent to
the official statements of the organization, the contention of the diminished
effectiveness of dissent loses its relevance. The very fact of expressed dissent
constitutes a breach in the phalanx of group expression. Once more the contest
over the Bricker Amendment has relevance. The dissidence of so many mem-
bers of the American Bar Association effectively counteracted the indorsement
of the proposal by its official governing body. This was recognized by the an-
guished protests of the Brickerite leaders against the expression of dissent. Mr.
Justice Harlan properly cast scorn upon the "supposition . . . that the voice
of a dissenter is less effective if he speaks it first in an attempt to influence the
action of a democratically organized group and then, if necessary, in dissent to
the recommendations of that group."' Milder forms of the "hampering" argu-
ment, as in suggestions that compelled dues reduce the dissentient's ability to
finance his expressions of opposition and correspondingly increase the resources
available to publicize the organizational stand, are particularly vulnerable to the
de minimis principle.
The "discouragement" argument may be a bit meatier. In specific cases,
one whose opinion is iot influenced by the views of the crowd still is reluctant
to take a stand which he fears may be unpopular. This, however, is a phe-
nomenon which permeates all society. It does not arise from the fact of formal
membership taken under compulsion. The organizational position will be ex-
pressed, regardless of whether membership is voluntary, extending only to a
portion of the general group, or is compelled and universal. In either case,
the timid or the reticent will remain silent. The bold and the voluble will let
their thoughts be known.
The simple truth is that the freedom of expression issue is completely ir-
relevant to the constitutional validity of compulsory organizational membership.
There is no semblance of compulsion of expression in compelled membership.
The real point at issue is the validity of exacting dues to be used, in whole or
in part, to promote measures which the duespayer detests. This raises a ques-
tion of economic due process: is it arbitrary and unreasonable to exact this
man's money to promote objects which he opposes? The reference to freedom
of expression clouds analysis by bringing in all the talk about the absolute na-
ture of "First Amendment freedoms" which some find written in the Con-
stitution," or the view that "exceptional circumstances" must be shown to
justify impingements on these interests.73 Even those who do not agree that
there is a "preferred place"74 for freedom of expression still may agree that
this freedom is entitled to high rank on the scale of values of a free society."5
It therefore is disadvantageous to discuss what is merely a question of the proper
disposition of compulsory dues in the guise of a supposed restriction upon liberty
71 Id. at 856.
72 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 872 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 882 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
74 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
75 "[T]he suppression or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot
be regarded otherwise than with grave concern." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 250 (1936).
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of discussion. Let us hope that, in the future, this error will be avoided.7
6. Enforced Contribution to Abhorred Objectives
Every governmentally sanctioned exaction is more or less distasteful to
those who must pay it. But, as Mr. Justice Harlan observed in his concurring
opinion in the Lathrop case, "a state taxpayer could [not] object on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds to the use of his money for school textbooks or instruction
which he finds intellectually repulsive, nor for the mere purchase of a flag for
the school."7 The minority must yield to the declared public purpose.
The tax analogy is persuasive as to the integrated bar, which from its form
of organization, purposes and objectives may be regarded as a type of govern-
mental agency. It is less apt as applied to the labor union, however. Thus far,
the union has not been entrusted with specific tasks to be accomplished for
government. It functions merely to aid in the accomplishment of the public
policy favoring collective bargaining where the majority of the employees de-
sire that method of dealing with their employer. It might have been adequate
therefore for Congress to have limited the nonmembers' contributions to their
respective shares of the actual cost of collective bargaining, applying the so-
called agency shop concept. Instead, it permitted a requirement of the full
payment of normal "dues, fees and assessments." This indicates congressional
approval of forced sharing in the expense of all normal union activities, of a
nonpolitical nature. The Hanson decision"5 clearly establishes the validity of
this means to the accomplishment of the legislative objective. Doubtless it was
felt that Congress might well have thought the accounting task of separating
collective bargaining costs from other legitimate union costs too burdensome
in relation to the advantage of charging the nonjoiner with only his proportionate
share of bargaining expense. What tipped the scale the other way in the eyes
of the seven Justices who concurred in the Street case" in reading an implied
prohibition of political expenditures? I think we may take it that it was quite
as much a strong doubt as to the constitutionality of requiring contributions
to such expenditures as it was a belief that Congress had intended to forbid
them. Justices Black and Douglas made their own views quite clear in that
respect. I think similar views must be ascribed to the other five, in view of
the clarity with which Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan,
demonstrated that Congress really could have meant no such thing as the
principal opinion assumes it to have intended."0
We may take it then as fairly indicated that the Court may not consider
that "political" activity on behalf of candidates or of measures is a purpose for
which funds exacted under compulsion of statute constitutionally may be used
76 It is perhaps significant that the so-called "plurality opinion" in Lathrop emphasized
that the case was concerned "only with a question of compelled financial support of group
activities, not with involuntary membership in any other aspect." 367 U.S. at 828.
77 367 U.S. at 860. He presses the tax analogy again at 865. This seems to be the whole
substance of Mr. Justice Whittaker's short concurrence on the same page.
78 Railway Employees' Dep't. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
79 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
80 Id. at 797 (dissenting opinion).
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against the will of the contributors. This statement applies to the bar as well
as to labor. Note the emphasis which Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion
in Lathrop places on "effort to improve the law in technical and non-contro-
versial areas."'" We must suppose this to mean "politically non-controversial"
since some of the most acrid controversy known to man has raged over technical
problems of legal procedure. Note also that the "plurality opinion" in Lathrop
lays stress upon the predominantly nonpolitical character of the activities ac-
tually pursued by the integrated, bar of Wisconsin. 2
Nonetheless, the Court has been reluctant squarely to face the issue of
constitutionality. It has limited the possibility of relief to those dissentients who
make known their objection to particular "political" activities that have been
undertaken and who can establish how much of their dues have been devoted
to these activities.8 3 The relief attainable remains uncertain. Five judges, one
hesitantly, suggest alternatively: (1) an injunction against the expenditure, from
the total budget set aside for advocative purposes, of the sum representing the
proportionate part of that item attributable to the dues of the dissentient;
(2) the restitution to the dissentient of that portion of his dues which was spent
for the objectionable political activity. 4 Perhaps these are simply different
aspects of the same general type of relief. The first method would be appropriate
if suit were brought before expenditure. The second method would be the
appropriate remedy if suit were delayed until after the expenditure had oc-
curred. The opinion points out that other methods are not foreclosed, but it
is a little difficult to determine what these might be, other than the sweeping
prohibition of all collection of dues from dissentients so long as the prohibited
expenditure exists, for which Mr. Justice Whittaker and Mr. Justice Black
would have voted." So long as the opinion of the Court in the Street case
stands, it is doubtful whether either unions or integrated bars are likely to be
successfully made defendants in actions brought in accordance with its sug-
gested procedures.
The real significance of the two decisions lies much more in what was
said and in what was not done than in what was done. The Court indicated
its distaste for taking money, by compulsion, to be spent for the promotion of
causes which the payer opposes. At the same time, it refrained from doing any-
thing to interfere with the functioning of organizations selected to execute
state and national purposes which the Court deemed constitutionally licit. Also,
81 367 U.S. at 863. The expression itself is taken by way of quotation from Judge Water-
man, writing in Dulles v. Johnson, 273 F.2d 362, 367 (2d Cir. 1959). Of course, this em-
phasis may be overestimated, since Mr. Justice Harlan would have concurred with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter to uphold the validity of using a compelled member's dues to advance political
programs against the dues-payer's will. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740, 806-19 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
82 "Both in purport and in practice the bulk of State Bar activities serve the function,
or at least so Wisconsin might reasonably believe, of elevating the educational and ethical
standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to the
people of the State, without any reference to the political process." 367 U.S. at 843. (Em-
phasis added.)
83 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Lathrop v. Donohue,
367 U.S. 820 (1961).
84 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, supra note 83, at 774-75.
85 Id. at 780 (Whittaker), and at 774-75 (Black).
THE THREE L'S- LAW, LABOR, LIBERTY
however, it refrained from renunciation of future exercise of power to remedy
abuses. In this there is a lesson and a warning which leaders of unions and of
integrated bars will do well to heed. Ignoring the import and the undertones
of Supreme Court opinions often shatters the judicial patience, leading the
Court to break in upon practices with which it had been loath to interfere.
This happened with respect to racially oriented covenants concerning the use
of land."6 It happened with respect to racial segregation in education.' And
now it is happening with respect to the apportionment of representation in
state legislatures."8 If a majority of the Justices becomes convinced that unions
and bar organizations are taking advantage of the procedural and other diffi-
culties which these. decisions throw in the pathways which dissentients must
take in search of relief, in order to engage in "political" activity of all sorts
in callous disregard of the position of individuals, particularly of individuals
so numerous as to constitute substantial minorities, there may come a time
when this majority will accept the views now held by Mr. Justice Black, by
the recent Mr. Justice Whittaker, and, in respect to the organized bar, by Mr.
Justice Douglas.
The question then arises, what should the organizations do to prevent
this shift in position? For unions, the answer seems fairly obvious. Effective steps
must be taken to divorce legislative and political promotion from the union
dues. This now has become a legal duty, as to the rail unions. Their statute
requires it, by judicial interpretation. However, the same result should follow
as to unions achieving various forms of "union security" under the National
Labor Relations Act in the states which do not enact right-to-work laws. The
statutory provisions are sufficiently similar to those governing the Street de-
cision to warrant like interpretive implication. " This divorce probably would
have to involve more than the currently practiced organization of independent
labor political organizations supported by voluntary contributions, over and
above regular dues and assessments."0 It likely will require that labor papers
either cease to publish items giving publicity to various political activities and
objectives, or that a separate subscription list, on a voluntary basis, be established
for them. It certainly will require that funds into which membership fees may
be traced shall not be used to contribute to the support in any way of political
activities, political candidates, political groups or legislative objectives.
With respect to integrated bars, the problem seems somewhat simpler.
Bar groups have not commonly engaged in the promotion of substantive legisla-
tive programs of a general nature. When they have done so, as in the case
of the ill-starred Bricker Amendment, the results have not tended to encourage
other ventures. What is immediately significant to bar organizations is the extent
to which more modest programs may be affected.
We may take it that seven members of the present Supreme Court of the
United States will concur in upholding the validity of an integrated bar. Mr.
86 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
87 Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294 (1954).
88 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
89 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (a) (3) (1958).
90 See Fillenwarth, Politics and Labor Unions, 37 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 172, 180 (1961).
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Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Frankfurter definitely have expressed their
opinion to that effect. The four who concurred in the so-called "plurality
opinion" in Lathrop properly may be considered as favoring the general validity
of bar integration. That opinion clearly differentiates between the compulsion
of membership in the bar and financial support of its varied general activities
on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the use of some part of the proceeds
from bar dues to advocate and lobby for the adoption of legislation. It is sig-
nificant that, after reciting the general nonlegislative activities of the Wisconsin
bar, the plurality opinion states that these are so reasonably related to "improv-
ing the quality of the legal service available to the people of the State" that to
promote them "is a legitimate end of state policy."' There follows the forth-
right declaration:
We think that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in order to further
the State's legitimate interests in raising the quality of profes-
sional services, may constitutionally require that the costs of im-
proving the profession in this fashion should be shared by the sub-
jects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program, the lawyers, even
though the organization created to attain the objective also engages
in some legislative activity. Given the character of the integrated
bar shown on this record, in the light of the limitation of the mem-
bership requirement to the compulsory payment of reasonable
annual dues, we are unable to find any impingement upon pro-
tected rights of association. 92
Mr. Justice Black qualifies for inclusion in the group approving the integrated
bar, aside from the question of using compelled dues in advancement of posi-
tions disapproved by a particular member, by virtue of his statement:
In saying all this, I do not mean to suggest that the Wisconsin
State Bar does not provide many useful and entirely lawful services.
Quite the contrary, the record indicates that this integrated bar
association, like other bar associations both integrated and voluntary,
does provide such services. But I think it clear that these aspects
of the Wisconsin State Bar are quite beside the point so far as
this case is concerned. For a State can certainly insure that the
members of its bar will provide any useful and proper services it
desires without creating an association with power to compel mem-
bers of the bar to pay money to support views to which they are
opposed or to fight views they favor. Thus, the power of a bar as-
sociation to advocate legislation at the expense of those who oppose
such legislation is wholly separable from any legitimate function of
an involuntary bar association and, therefore, even for those who
subscribe to the balancing test, there is nothing to balance against
this invasion of constitutionally protected rights.92
This seems a clear admission that an "involuntary bar association" does have
legitimate functions.
As a result, only Mr. Justice Douglas, of the present Supreme Court, ap-
pears opposed to the validity, in all aspects, of an integrated bar. Even he may
not be quite so intransigent as most of his opinion might indicate. At one point
91 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961).
92 Ibid.
93 Id. at 874-75 (dissenting opinion).
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he stated: "The sole question is the extent of the power of a State over a lawyer
who rebels at becoming a member of the integrated bar and paying dues to
support activities that are offensive to him."9 4 This term "activities" may be
taken to mean only activities involving advocacy of legislation, which was the
major, if not the only, point stressed by the appellant, or it might refer to all
other sorts of activities. Certainly, however, his opening statement that "the
question in the present case concerns the power of a State to compel lawyers
to belong to a statewide bar association, the organization commonly referred
to as the 'integrated bar,' ""' contains no exceptions, and much of Mr. Justice
Douglas' other language, already quoted, indicates a disapproval of the entire
institution. Mr. Justice White, of course, may not presently be counted either
way.
As to the study of problems relating to the improvement of the substantive
law, and as to advocacy of the legislative adoption of the results of such studies,
only the Frankfurter-Harlan opinion may be cited as squarely favoring it. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court, in its decision, relied heavily upon the fact that, under
the rule creating the State Bar of Wisconsin and under the latter's by-laws, the
legislative advocacy embarked upon by the bar must be confined to matters
related to "the administration of justice, court reform and legal practice.""8
It is not clear how much this expressed limitation influenced the positions of
the various Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. The plurality
opinion did not mention it. The Harlan-Frankfurter opinion quoted it."7 The
Whittaker and the Black opinions took no formal account of it. The Douglas
opinion mentioned it, followed by the statement: "It is difficult for me to see
how the State can compel even that degree of subservience of the individual
to the group."9
On the other hand, it is to be noted that the "plurality opinion" speaks of
the announced function of the integrated bar as a forum for "discussion of...
law reform"99 and quotes the bar's rules of policy and procedure for legislative
activity which, inter alia, provide that all sections and committees are expected
to examine bills "that would make any changes in the substantive law, and keep
the Board of Governors and the Executive Committee fully informed so that
ill-advised bills can be opposed and meritorious bills can be supported."' 0
Also it recites a list of matters on which the State Bar or its committees have
taken positions, some of which involve substantive law solely and cannot be
regarded as confined to matters of "the administration of justice, court reform,
and legal practice."'' The Harlan-Frankfurter opinion makes similar reference
to the use of the bar as a means of recommending law reform of all sorts."0 2
The truth is that there are two distinct areas in which the lawyers can
94 Id. at 878 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 877.
96 Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404, 409 (1960).
97 Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 861 (1961) (concurring opinion).
98 Id. at 880 (dissenting opinion).
99 Id. at 829 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
100 Id. at 834, n.9.
101 Id. at 835-39.
102 Id. at 863 (concurring opinion).
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operate: the area of legislation affecting "the administration of justice, court
reform, and legal practice" and the area of substantive legislation in general.' °
Also, there are two methods of operation: active legislative advocacy or, on the
other hand, study and recommendation for action without active advocacy.
It may well be that in respect to matters in the first area the Supreme Court
eventually will approve expenditure of funds for legislative advocacy, regardless
of the dissent or objection of minority members, while, at the same time, it may
feel that as to matters in the second area the state organized bar should confine
itself to study and advice. It might be well for integrated bars to structure their
machinery for dealing with studies of the law in action and for legislative rec-
ommendations and lobbying activity to conform to this suggested differentiation.
In another respect, due process may come to impose substantial limits on
the activities of integrated bars as agencies for study and action in the realm of
law improvement. It may be necessary to take steps to insure the approval
of the officially adopted legislative program of the bar by a substantial majority
of the membership, and to apprise the public of the exact division of opinion
where the bar recommends rather than advocates.
The "plurality opinion" in the Lathrop case cites and quotes extracts from
the statement of policy of the Wisconsin State Bar relating to legislative activity
which are designed to insure that advocacy shall be confined to those matters
about which there is substantial unanimity on the part of the Bar. If "it is
obvious that the membership of the Bar is of a substantially divided opinion,
the Board of Governors shall take no definite position." However, the Board,
in such a case, may report its vote to the Legislature, as an indication of the
state of its view.'
These provisions make substantially the distinction between legislative
advocacy and indorsement or recommendation suggested in the preceding dis-
cussion. They also suggest the path that could be pursued to deal with this
problem of confining legislative advocacy, even of matters affecting the ad-
ministration of justice, to propositions about which there is a common consensus
supported by most of the bar.
It is questionable whether either legislative programs or general recommen-
dations should be promulgated by small governing boards, executive committees
or the like. Probably they should emanate from bodies based so as to involve
substantial representation of the bar as a whole.
103 Compare the point made by Judge Waterman as to the qualification of a bar associa-
tion for the exemption from federal estate tax, given only to. bequests to benevolent corpora-
tions "no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda or otherwise
attempting to influence legislation," 26 U.S.C. § 812(d):
Moreover, the legislative recommendations of the Associations, insofar
as these recommendations do not involve matters the responsibility for which
has been entrusted to the Associations by the Legislature, are designed to
improve court procedure or to clarify some technical matter of substantive
law. They are not intended for the economic aggrandizement of a particular
group or to promote some larger principle of governmental policy. These
two factors lead us to the conclusion that the recommendations of the As-
sociations concerning impending legislation are not such as to cause the for-
feiture of charitable status under Section 812(d)." Dulles v. Johnson, 273
F.2d 362, 367 (2d Cir. 1959).
104 367 U.S. at 834.
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It might well be that for an item to become part of the legislative program,
it should receive at least a 60 per cent affirmative vote from whatever body
is assigned the adoptive function. For a mere recommendation, a majority vote
would suffice. Publicity setting forth the exact vote pro and con, with respect
both to legislative programs and to recommendations, would help to rebut
the argument concerning regimentation and abridgment of free speech.
If greater assurance of representation of general bar sentiment is desired,
provision might be made for a referendum of the membership on any item
of legislative program - on petition of a sufficient number and distribution
of the membership to prevent abuse.
It seems to me that safeguards along this line would answer effectively
the arguments concerning regimentation and goose-stepping brigades. The
Supreme Court, as presently constituted, seems disposed to consider favorably
the public interest to be served by making the integrated bars into vehicles for
study and report concerning matters of law reform. This function cannot be
fulfilled effectively if dissentients are enabled to block proposals to which they
are opposed by the threat of suits of one sort or another. It cannot be in the
public interest to have a muzzled bar. Individual study and advocacy will not
meet the need. In these days, substantial resources and pooled effort are essen-
tial to effective study and qualified draftsmanship. Lobbying is almost indis-
pensable to a successful program of legislation. Once it is recognized that the
issues involved relate not at all to liberty of expression in any of it forms, but
rather to the old, familiar issue of how far the individual may be required to
subordinate his material welfare to the public good, there should be little diffi-
culty in demonstrating to the judges that the general interest in securing the
informed and disinterested opinions of specially equipped minds on matters
relating to the improvement of the law is, indeed, "most substantial." Against
it, the comparatively slight drain upon the resources of the individual dissentient
fades into insignificance. It is not to be expected that the Supreme Court lightly
will strike down so important a public interest when it is made manifest that
there is no issue of freedom of expression at stake.
On the other hand, the labor union's claim to use the dues exacted from
unwilling members for the promotion of legislative programs rests upon no
such general public interest. The unions have not been made into public agencies
for law reform, even as to labor law. Their positions represent the reaction of
the formulators to the question of what is in the best interests of the union
members, or, at the widest, of labor as an element in society. It certainly cannot
be contended that there is any violation of due process in prohibiting the use
of funds, involuntarily exacted, for political ends. Consequently, it seems most
likely that the course of decision will call more and more for a rather rigid
separation of the dues exacted from unwilling members and the union's expendi-
tures for legislative and political objectives. How to work out this separation,
preserving the legitimate interest of union members in being able voluntarily
to formulate legislative programs and to support them financially, presents a
striking challenge to union statesmanship.
